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1. Introduction 
This paper presents the agenda of empirical research on the relation-
ship between the public sphere and the law that was recently launched 
at the Brazilian Center of Law and Democracy (Núcleo Direito De-
mocracia – NDD)1 and at Direito GV.2 We will first present the as-
sumptions that guide our task in the empirical field, resulting in a  
particular way of seeing democracy and the relations between society 
and the state. Then, we will briefly present the main partial results of 
empirical research3 developed by this group in nine Brazilian state 
Courts of Appeal, on the anti-racism struggle in Brazil and its rela-
tionships to Brazilian institutions. Based on this data, we will make a 
preliminary analysis.  
The research examines the decisions rendered by the Court of Ap-
peals of the State of São Paulo that deal with racism, racial discri-
                                                     
1  The Law and Democracy Nucleus is a research group of Centro Brasileiro de 
Análise e Planejamento (CEBRAP), a Brazilian interdisciplinary think thank de-
dicated to investigate theoretically and empirically the relations between Law 
and Democracy in the tradition of critical theory.  
2  “Direito GV” is a Brazilian Law School that develops a Law & Development 
research agenda.  
3  Other research studies, undertaken by NDD, raise and nurture the reflection we 
do here: one of them aimed to organize the legislation on gender in Brazil and 
seek out decisions on discrimination of women in the labor and electoral justices; 
and the other study compared three judicial review mechanisms, the Commission 
on Constitution and Justice, the Federal Supreme Court and presidential vetoes 
from selected themes (Rodriguez/Nobre 2010). Both were funded by the project 
“Pensando o Direito” (Thinking About Law) organized by the Office for Legis-
lative Affairs of the Ministry of Justice of Brazil (SAL) and the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP). Those interested can see the reports posted on 
the SAL website (<www.portal.mj.gov.br/ data/Pages/MJ5C2A38D7PTBRIE. 
htm>). One of them has also been posted in the Revista da Presidência da Re-
pública (Journal of the Presidency): Nobre/Rodriguez (2009). 
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mination and racial defamation.4 We will briefly present the results 
and then discuss some of the problems the project faced to outline a 
model for studying the interaction between law and public sphere.  
To do that, the first part of this paper will identify some areas of 
interaction between the law and the public sphere, which we incor-
porate into our research. In the second part, we will reflect on the 
directions of the flow of arguments and demands within the public 
sphere especially within formal institutions with a view to outline 
these spaces of interaction. In the conclusion of the paper, we will 
point out the next steps of our empirical research. 
 
2. Spaces for Interaction and Social Movements 
A key objective of the research program on Law and Public Sphere 
is to show that formal institutions, especially law, are not only spaces 
dominated by technical rationality; that is, law is not an instrument 
to obtain unambiguous solutions for actual cases submitted to it. This 
is an area of deliberative dispute for the sense of legal standards and 
for the correct interpretation of the legal rules. The creation of laws 
does not put an end to the struggle for the creation of rights, which 
forms a new arena for debate for the solution of concrete cases.  
For a technical and textual view of the law that goes along with 
the traditional concept of separation of powers, the interaction be-
tween the law and the public sphere lies outside of it: legal rules are 
the main source of law and function as an instrument of the legal will 
of the people. That is why the judges are seen as la bouche de la loi, 
responsible for subsuming specific cases to abstract rules to reach the 
correct solution for each case.5 
For this design, at least in its ideal setting, the grounds for the  
decision of concrete cases are the rules of law based, in turn, on 
the will of the people expressed through the parliament. The basis 
of the decision, therefore, would not be problematic and would not 
be subject to dispute. Obviously, there may be disagreements among 
judges about what should be the appropriate legal rule to the case, but 
                                                     
4  There is no space in this paper to display all the results obtained, neither is it 
our main purpose in this paper. For a full description, see Machado/Püschel/Ro-
driguez (2009). 
5  For a full exposition of these problems, see Rodriguez (2010). 
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everyone’s goal is the same: finding the appropriate rule and subsum-
ing the case to it.  
This way of conceiving the operation of the law has lost ground 
in legal theory, at least since the second half of the twentieth cen-
tury.6 This theoretical shift is linked to structural changes that have 
changed both the way of making laws and the action of the judiciary 
and the traditional configuration of the three branches of power. For 
example, standards became increasingly important as a legislative 
tool and as an instrument to solve conflicts among the interpretation of 
legal rules. There is no space here to describe in detail these changes 
(Rodriguez 2010). For our purposes, it must be said that, at least since 
the second half of the twentieth century, legal theory can hardly affirm 
the existence of a single legal-technical solution for each case.7 
A consensus was gradually formed, ruling out to subsume as a po-
tential model for the rationality of law and for the actions of 
judges (Alexy 1989), as it is clear that there is always more than 
one possible answer for each case. In fact, judges do not simply ap-
ply a general rule to a concrete case. The literature on the law has 
shown that judges take decisions that cannot be described as an act 
of mere application of a general rule or of subsuming a case to a gen-
eral rule. For this reason, the theory of law starts to reflect on this 
space for the choice of judicial authority.  
Doing that has consequences to the separation of powers. After 
all, the obligation to apply general rules created by the Parliament is 
due to the fact that these rules were created by the people through his 
representatives. If judges have the power to choose among different 
possible decisions to the same case and do not find a single decision 
that follow directly from the general rules, everything changes. Judges 
must explain why that decision was rendered rather than another; oth-
                                                     
6  One could say this way of conceiving the law is formalist as opposed to non-
formalist visions that do not value the autonomy of the law. Our conception of 
the law disagrees with the one we have just described, but does not devaluate 
autonomy. That is why it would be more precise to say we stand for a “new 
formalism” and a new conception of the law’s technique, as will be clarified later 
on in this article.  
7  Our concern here is only the standpoint of theory. It would be necessary to re-
build the judicial practices historically, that is, judgments of courts, so as to have 
a clear picture of how the judges of each time used to think. There are very few 
studies of this kind in Brazil, for example, see Lopes (2010). 
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erwise a purely arbitrary decision would be characterized in opposi-
tion to the ideals of the rule of law. Obviously, this change in the legal 
rationality is also a change in the rationale of the separation of powers. 
Indeed, many theoreticians of law hastened to say, vis-à-vis this 
state of affairs, that this choice would be, in fact, merely arbitrary, 
subjective, “political”, as Hans Kelsen put it (Kelsen 1967). Obvi-
ously, in light of an ideal of legal security that sought to find one 
answer for each case based on legal rules, those scholars were right. 
However, since the early twentieth century the theory of law began 
to investigate whether this ideal would work with an improper model 
of rationality to deal with law, thus designing an ideal of legal securi-
ty impossible to achieve.  
Such theorists have requested new models of rationality to tackle 
the indeterminacy of court action, but without considering it sub-
jective or irrational. The question of the theory of law is then the fol-
lowing: If it is impossible to describe the court action as the identifi-
cation of a single correct answer for each case, is it possible to con-
sider it from another model of rationality? If yes, what would this 
model look like?  
The paths chosen by theorists to carry out this task were various. 
The history of these attempts is intertwined with the history of the 
legal theory in the second half of the twentieth century. Some authors, 
such as Theodor Viehweg, were inspired by Aristotle’s Topics that 
sought another model of rationality (Viehweg 1979). Others, like 
Chaim Perelmann, based their thoughts on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Pe-
relmann 1999). In more recent times, we have witnessed the revival of 
Kantian practical reason in the work of Jürgen Habermas, Robert 
Alexy and Klaus Günther, in the form of a theory of argumentation 
(Alexy 1989; Günther 1993; Habermas 1996). In any case, their goal 
is to think of the activity of addressing concrete cases in rational 
terms, but according to another rationale.  
This theoretical move is perceived by some authors as the recogni-
tion of the failure of law as a regulatory mechanism, a sign of its “de-
differentiation” in relation to the spheres of morality, politics, eco-
nomics, etc.8 After all, the autonomy of law would lie precisely in the 
ability to decide cases based on legal arguments, that is, on legal rules, 
                                                     
8  For this point, see Luhmann (1983). 
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from which it is possible to draw precise solutions to the case con-
cerned.9 
This alleged “loss of technicality” of legal decisions would be a 
threat to the ability of the law to regulate society and stabilize expecta-
tions. The law would lose its specificity by allowing judicial officers 
to decide on the basis of moral, ethical, religious norms. Of course, for 
those authors seeking other ways to think about the rationality of law, 
this movement would not necessarily result in “de-differentiation” or 
“de-technicization” of the law. What could happen would be a change 
in the patterns of the limits between the law and the other social 
spheres, that is, another legal technique would emerging that would be 
appropriate for the characteristics of today’s society.  
If you think of this second theoretical register, such a change in ra-
tionality can be seen even as a strengthening of the rule of law by 
strengthening democracy. Indeed, a legal language that is less technic-
al, less specialized, or, put another way, less technocratic, could help 
ordinary citizens understand the legal debates, enabling court deci-
sions to be discussed in the non-specialized public sphere. Besides 
this, such change may facilitate the participation of citizens in public 
debate that results in the making of final decisions. Legal language is 
then open to non-specialized considerations, setting the scene for a 
debate where there is easy access to the problems concerned.  
For instance, in cases of high-voltage politics, the Brazilian Feder-
al Supreme Court (STF) has convened public hearings10 of cases tried 
by the court. Moreover, the court has admitted, in a much more per-
missive way, that civil society organizations and individuals provide 
amicus curiae11 to inform the court of any relevant arguments 
and information to the case at trial. Additionally, the justices of the 
Brazilian Federal Supreme Court have interacted with the press dur-
ing the trial of cases to put forward their diverging points of view 
in the nightly news watched in Brazil on Globo channel. During 
                                                     
9  The key author here is Max Weber. For a more systematic description of the 
Weberian argument, see Trubek (1972). 
10  The Federal Supreme Court can organize public hearings to get information it 
believes relevant to a case (see art. 9, §1º, Federal law 9.868 de 1999). Actually, 
the court has been using this possibility to hear civil society in controversial  
cases.  
11  Amicus curiae is a procedural instrument that allow civil society to speak before 
the Federal Supreme Court (see art. 7º, §2º, Federal Law 9.868/99).  
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some of the Federal Supreme Court deliberations, justices were inter-
viewed live on national television every day, before or after they made 
their votes public. 
This is a research agenda to be explored, but either way, it seems 
clear that the Brazilian judiciary has opened itself to the public on 
various issues it examines. Indeed, this whole process could be inter-
preted, according to a more traditional view of the problem (Rodri-
guez 2010), as a violation of separation of powers in its most tradi-
tional sense and an advancement of the judiciary on the legislative 
branch of power.  
Again, if we look at this process as a shift in the rationality of 
the law, we can say that there is a new model of a separation of pow-
ers in operation. In this model, the judiciary performs other duties 
according to another rationale and, therefore, its interaction with the 
public sphere then changes. Instead of merely applying the political 
will of the people expressed in the law, this power establishes its own 
and independent relationship with the public sphere (Kirchheimer 
1961),12 developing institutional spaces for this interaction to occur.13 
The decision making process becomes, in this scenario, a space 
for interaction between the law and the public sphere. By losing its 
logic and deductive characteristics, the basis of decisions becomes 
problematic, therefore, liable to be disputed by the interested parties, 
whether those directly involved in the case or third parties indirectly 
involved in the decision. The fundamental legal issue that emerges is 
setting the terms of this dispute, namely the creation of a procedure 
and a proper rationale to deliver a well-justified and convincing deci-
sion for those directly concerned in the case and the participants of the 
public sphere.  
A third important element is precisely the growing interaction be-
tween judges and the media, just mentioned above. A case in point is 
the judges’ increased exposure to TV and newspapers and the strateg-
ic postponement of important decisions (or individual judges request-
ing to see records, thus deferring their decision) with a view to, for a 
                                                     
12  To be precise, Kirchheimer talks about “public opinion” and not “public sphere”. 
13  As mentioned in notes 10 and 11, the law authorizes the Federal Supreme Court 
to promote public hearings before his deliberation and decision of a case. The 
same court admits the presentation of Amicus Curiae by several NGOs and asso-
ciations interested in the cases under the court’s jurisdiction. 
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few weeks, the public’s perception of the case on trial. But these are, 
as yet, impressionable perceptions, because this is a field that still 
lacks empirical research. 
At this point, it is important to open a parenthesis. Individuals, 
groups and social movements can directly file lawsuits in order to 
produce certain results from the judiciary branch of power. This type 
of action is often called strategic litigation. The discussion about the 
flow of society’s demands towards the judiciary should certainly take 
this phenomenon into account.  
For the purpose of this paper, we will not go into further detail of 
this phenomenon in Brazil. But it is important to call attention to 
the phenomenon and the fact that Brazil has a peculiarity in this 
field. The demands that arise in society are not brought to the judi-
ciary only by NGOs, lawyers working pro bono or legal assistance 
services.  
Brazil has the Public Attorney’s Office (MP), a state authority 
that has the power to file suits on behalf of society.14 Therefore, to 
obtain a complete picture of the problems that concern us, we must 
also study the interaction of the Public Attorney’s Office with society. 
We will explore this point in more detail in the next section. 
Let us get back to the main topic. All institutional mechanisms 
that promote the interaction between society and the judiciary are 
related, after all, to the characteristics of legal technique. Its goal is 
to inform the court about the possible grounds for choosing between 
the various possible legal solutions with regard to the same case.15 
Such mechanisms, which may serve to enrich the debate on such 
fundamentals and, by consequence, on the possible answers to be giv-
en to individual cases, can increase the legitimacy of the justification 
                                                     
14  Of course this raises the questions: How and why the MP decides to sue some-
one? The public sphere should control this decision. But how?  
15  The fear of advancing a non-legal rationality in the context of judicial decisions 
does not seem to remain solid, at least in the Federal Supreme Court. There is  
little influence of arguments not related to law in this court, according to a re-
search conducted in 2010 (Rodriguez 2010). The core problem of the Federal  
Supreme Court seems to be the difficulty of forming a solid decision-making  
rationale: each judge develops a profile in order to deal with the sources of law 
and raises different grounds in the solution of the same case, which creates an  
argumentative chaos of technical arguments. See the research quoted and Voj-
vodic/Cardoso/Machado (2009).  
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to the solution adopted and the decision taken.16 By bringing more 
arguments into the judiciary, this contributes to reducing the risk of 
decision makers disclosing their justification of any socially relevant 
views and interests.17 
Interestingly, in Brazil, some social movements have organized 
themselves to push their demands inside the courts, but some have 
not. For example, the judiciary’s actions on issues like health and edu-
cation are very intense, in contrast to the actions geared to the matters 
of gender and racism.  
As we will see shortly, some social movements have organized 
their discourse and demands around the purpose of passing laws in 
parliament and requiring that the judiciary promote a textual, precise, 
dispute-free law enforcement. However, other social players have 
devised specific strategies to serve on the judiciary. Describing this 
picture, which remains unexplored by scholars of law and social 
sciences in Brazil, is one of the purposes of our research.  
Below are some thoughts on what has happened in the field of 
combating racism in Brazil. 
 
3. An Example of Research: the Crimes of Racism and Racial  
Discrimination 
Two issues are very significant in the processes of passing laws 
against race discrimination in Brazil. On the one hand, it is possible 
to recognize that the symbolic role of the law is emphasized. It can 
be said that the black movement, a key player in the juridification of 
this issue, has focused demands to lawmakers around strategies in-
tended to expand, harden or improve the criminalization of discrimi-
                                                     
16  We put this statement in the conditional mode because I have no news of re-
search on the legitimacy of the decisions of the judiciary before the public 
sphere. 
17  Here we disagree with Ronald Dworkin and his theory of interpretation as inte-
gration, where the judge alone has the Herculean task of rebuilding the tradition 
for a well-justified response (see Dworkin 1988). Our vision of this problem in-
volves a combination of institutional constraints and hermeneutic models able 
to bring into the judiciary as many voices as possible in order to get a well-
justified solution. We would call this model of justice a polyphonic one. On 
the concept of institutional constraints and hermeneutic models (see Rodriguez 
2011).  
Law and Public Sphere 171 
natory and prejudiced acts and, to a large extent, these demands were 
satisfied by the legislative branch of power.  
A discussion of other forms of intervention and other fields of ac-
tion within the law has just started to gain a greater importance, in 
particular by the participation of Brazil in the World Conference 
Against Racism sponsored by the UN in 2001 in Durban, which dis-
cussed affirmative measures both on the agenda of state authorities18 
and in the legislative branch of power.19 This discussion has gained 
force ever since. 
Furthermore, a set of diagnoses of insufficiency or ineffectiveness 
of criminal laws set in motion the valorization of other forms of in-
tervention. When we look back to the sixty years of criminal legisla-
tion against racism and racist practices in Brazil, we see that the en-
actment of a new law was generally preceded and encouraged by criti-
cisms to some previous law by those players working in the formal 
and/or informal public sphere. News statutes have been created 
in order to solve the efficiency problems of the older ones, but this 
process has not produced the expected outcomes when they are ex-
amined from the point of view of the social movements.  
The first anti-racism statute, “Afonso Arinos Law”, was enacted 
in 1951.20 It addressed discriminatory conduct as misdemeanors. The-
                                                     
18  A case in point is the fact that several ministries have adopted a quota system for 
the promotion of employees; the establishment in May 2002 of the program 
“Programa de Ações Afirmativas” (Affirmative Actions Program), aimed at in-
creasing the participation of black people, women and people with disabilities 
in leadership positions throughout the federal administration; the implementation 
of a quota system in some universities. Moreover, after the Federal Supreme 
Court declared the constitutionality of the principle of that affirmative action, 
even the judiciary branch of power adopted the requirement of a minimum per-
centage of black people employed in companies providing services to the courts. 
19  The issue of that affirmative action was taken to Parliament with more emphasis 
on discussion of the law on social and racial quotas in federal and state universi-
ties (PL 73/1999, authored by Rep. Nice Lobão, with its various amendments and 
attachments, still pending in the House of Representatives) and the Statute of  
Racial Equality (Senate Bill – PLS 213/2003), a bill authored by Senator Paulo 
Paim (PT-RS), which was under debate in Congress since 1998 and was ap-
proved only in 2008. These projects focus on establishing a set of affirmative ac-
tions that involve “special programs and measures adopted by the State to correct 
racial inequalities and to promote equal opportunities” (PLS 213/2003). 
20  Federal Statute 1390, July, 3, 1951. Named after the Congress representative that 
presented it, “Afonso Arinos Law” was the first Federal statute to explicitly pro-
hibit racial discrimination in Brazil.  
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reafter, incisive demands were made to criminalize such acts, and as a 
response, racism was made a serious, “unbailable and indefensible 
crime” by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988.  
The federal legislation promulgated after this constitution focused 
on regulating and defining punishable conducts – the main statute is 
Act 7716/1989, with the original text altered a couple of times by oth-
er statutes. 
The inclusion of Article 20 into Act 7716/1989, through Act 
9459/1997, which describes the practice, inducement or incitement 
to discrimination or prejudice, responds to the criticism that the pre-
vious law described the crimes in an overly detailed fashion and 
made it too difficult to enforce the law.  
Article 2 of Law # 9.459/97 of 1997 is another law also added to 
the penal code and is a form of aggravated slander, with a sentence 
one to three years confinement plus a fine, “if the grievance derives 
from affronts to race, color, ethnicity, religion or origin”.21 
This change was, as justified in the bill of law, intended to correct 
one of the points mentioned as the most problematic for the enforce-
ment of the previous law: the fact that slander due to race and color 
continued to be considered by the courts as mere ordinary slanders, 
with much lighter punishments than those given out for in the “Caó 
Law”.22 
So, in this matter, in Brazil we have three types of crimes: i) acts 
involving the refusal to serve a person or deny access in any way to 
her based on race, skin color, ethnicity, religion or nationality; ii) a 
general description of the crime of racism, as “practicing, inducing or 
inciting discrimination or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity, 
religion or nationality”; iii) an aggravated slander, “if the grievance 
derives from insults to race, color, ethnicity, religion or origin”.  
It is worth noting that in the first two types of conduct the public 
prosecutor undertakes the criminal proceedings, while racial slander is 
undertaken by private individual initiative. This also meant being sued 
by a criminal private prosecution filed by the victim.  
An exception to the general system of public prosecution, criminal 
private prosecutions offer practical difficulties with regard to their 
                                                     
21  Article 2 of Law # 9.459/97 of 1997. 
22  Federal Statute n. 7.437, December 20, 1985. 
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processing, as these actions lie within several limits, including strict 
formal assumptions, statutory limitation period of six months for fil-
ing the lawsuit, payment of court costs, and requires an attorney. 
Moreover, one of the foundations of criticism also refers to the fact 
that submitting a crime to a criminal private prosecution also means, 
in our system, that the victim’s interests in the prosecution is more 
important than the public interest, that is, it would have an undesirable 
symbolic effect, in addition to the problematic practical effects.  
In addition, as we will see, once the distinction between racism 
and racial slander is not clear and indisputable, the fact that these two 
crimes are subject to different legal procedures has considerable con-
sequences. 
To develop further our understanding of the enforcement and in-
effectiveness of laws against racism, we collected rulings made by 
nine Brazilian Courts of Appeals (from the following Brazilian federal 
States: Acre, Bahia, Mato Grosso do Sul, Paraíba, Pernambuco, Rio 
de Janeiro, Rondônia, Rio Grande do Sul and São Paulo) from 1998 
to 2010. 
A search for rulings of the above Courts of Appeal related to rac-
ism was carried out using the databases available at the Lawyers’ As-
sociation of São Paulo (Associação dos Advogados de São Paulo – 
AASP) and at the websites of the Courts of Appeal with updates 
that run through September 2010. The search used the keywords  
“racism” (“racismo”); “higher degree slander” (“injúria qualificada”); 
“racial slander” (“injúria racial”); and “racial discrimination”, and 
came back with 2061 rulings. Manual searches discarded non-penal 
rulings, as well as cases which debated exclusively procedural or in-
cidental matters, leaving 201 court decisions – this number therefore 
represents all cases of crimes related to racism, racial discrimination 
or racial offenses made public by the Brazilian Courts of Appeal re-
searched. 
Of those decisions, there were: 118 criminal appeals; 43 criminal 
interlocutory appeals (“Recursos em sentido estrito”); 31 writs of ha-
beas corpus; five criminal actions conducted directly by Court of Ap-
peal (special jurisdictions); two appeals against liberatory decisions on 
Habeas Corpus; two atypical proceedings involving petitions to prose-
cute public officers and one prejudicial appeal arguing the non-
impartiality of the judge (“Exceção de Suspeição”). 
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As can be seen in the graph below, most of these cases (118 in all) 
reached the court after the announcement of the judgment of merit 
(condemning or absolving) in the first instance. A significant number 
of cases though were tried in court before the judgment of merits – 
29 after the judge’s initial ruling that accepted the charge and 43 after 
the judge’s initial ruling that rejected the complaint, thwarting the 
continuation of the case. 
As for Courts of Appeal rulings, if we only take into consideration 
the decisions that analyzed the merits of the case – either an acquittal 
or conviction (118 in total) – it became evident that the court con-
demned more than it absolved: 55 convictions compared with 41 abso-
lutions. When it came to decisions taken by the court when something 
was questioned before it ended in the first instance, the number of 
cases closed by the Appeal Court’s decision – based on rejection of 
charges, extinction of punish ability, dismissal or annulment of the 
case – compared with those that were determined to be tried are as 
follows: 58 decisions of the first kind compared with 33 of the 
second, which represents 34.3% of the decisions determining the un-
timely end of the criminal action compared to 26.1% determining its 
continuation, respectively. The significance of the first output is one 
important factor that plays a role in the general dissatisfaction about 
how the judiciary deals with criminal cases related to racism.  
Taking into consideration all 201 cases (that is, convictions and 
absolutions, as well as decisions taken to proceed or annul cases), 
we notice a prevalence of cases in which a decision was taken to end a 
case prematurely (58 cases between rejections, extinction of punisha-
bility, dismissal or annulment of the case). And following this: 
55 convictions; the 41 absolutions and the 33 procedural decisions to 
continue the case.  
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Graph 1: Decisions of Brazilian Courts of Appeal 
Convictions were, as indicated in the graph, for the most part (49), for 
slander (plain slander or racial slander), with or without sentencing 
increases. We located only three convictions for the crime of racism  
in accordance with Article 20 of Law No. 7.716/89; one conviction 
based on the denial or obstruction of employment (Article 4 of the 
same law) one conviction, for preventing access of a public place (Ar-
ticle 8 of the same law); and one conviction for preventing marriage or 
social contact (Article 14).  
It is remarkable that there are such low number of cases involving 
racism and situations of discrimination. 
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Graph 2: Charges of the convictions 
As for the sentences handed out, 10 of the 55 convictions amounted 
to one year in prison and a fine of ten days, which corresponds to the 
minimum sentence for high degree slander. In 24 cases, the sentence 
was fixed at 16 months, which corresponds to the minimum legal limit 
for high degree slander with a one third increase based on circums-
tances from Article 141 of the Penal Code (in the presence of many 
people or with media exposure or against public officer). The harshest 
sentence was three years of imprisonment, set by the courts in two 
cases. In many cases, penalties of imprisonment were replaced with 
community service. In two cases, the convictions were followed by 
an exoneration, as it took too long to persecute according to the legal 
limit of time (“extinção da pretensão executória da pena”).23 
                                                     
23  They were calculated in our research together with the cases of convictions be-
cause we deem it relevant that the procedure came to an end and reached a legal 
conclusion that recognized the perpetrator’s responsibility and wrongdoing and 
just suspended the execution of the penalty.  
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The graph below (n.3) shows the number of absolutions. They 
were justified in half the cases (19 of 41) based on a lack of evidence. 
In 20 of the cases of absolution the judges analyzed the merits of the 
case and declared lack of a crime. Within this context, it is significant 
to the argument that the offender did not act with harmful intent, or in 
bad faith, even though it was clear in the offence that it involved a 
racial nature, and the second instance decision made by the court does 
not deny this. 
 
Graph 3: Reasons for acquittals 
These results allow for some conclusions. In the first place, they  
contradict the perception that no convictions were upheld at least in 
terms of the Courts of Appeal. Overall, the number of convictions 
reached approximately 27.3% (or 55 rulings), which is significant. 
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that the convictions were mostly 
for crimes of plain slander or racial slander. Racism or discrimination 
appeared only in eight cases of convictions. The definition of the 
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facts submitted to the judiciary, mostly related to verbal offenses with 
a racial slurs as racial slander and not as the crime of “racism” is criti-
cized by victims and by actors of social movements.  
What seems also troublesome and frustrating from the point of 
view of the judicial system is that many cases in which trials end be-
fore the judge could even declare a sentence: the 58 cases in which 
the court decided on an early closure of the case. 
This number is not only superior to the cases in which the court 
proceeded with the case (33), but also represents the most common 
outcome of the cases tried by Courts of Appeal: it represents 27.9% 
of the total cases analyzed.  
To understand these results, one must be sensitive to the inner 
workings of the country’s legal system, more specifically, the dynam-
ic of the application of criminal and procedural rules. The main ques-
tions to be considered are linked to the problem of changing 
the classification of racial cases (racism/racial slander).  
As we have mentioned, one of the most significant controversies 
found was the debate over the qualification of the facts of what de-
fines racism or racial slander. In some cases, the court in its decisions 
reevaluated the previous legal definition of the crimes as racism, es-
tablishing that the case should be considered as either plain slander 
or racial slander. The change in the definition of what is racism or 
slander has the practical effect of dismissing cases for their lack of 
timeliness in filing the initial charge. This happens because of the 
different ways in which each case is processed: racism is tried 
through a public penal trial – that means, it is tried by the State Prose-
cutor (“Ministério Público”); while racial slander should be tried 
through private criminal action, that is, by the offended party who 
seeks a lawyer and has six months from the time she/he learns who 
the perpetrator of the offense is to file a charge.  
The different procedures for these crimes outline a problematic 
situation: every time that racism is changed into racial slander, after 
the six month deadline mentioned above, it will no longer be possi-
ble to initiate the required procedure. Even if the deadline has not 
expired yet, the decision may be handed down so late in the game 
that the offended party barely has time to bring together a penal case. 
For this reason it is very common to recognize a lack of timeli-
ness as an output for these cases.  
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We must not presume that this is the desired result of judges 
when they call for the case to be reassessed. Especially since the clas-
sification of cases brought about by insults of a racial type, such as 
racial slander, is justifiable from a legal point of view. There are in-
trinsic elements to the system of legal argumentation that show that 
the court’s classification of this type of conduct as racial slander, al-
though these elements are far from being the only form of dogmatic 
interpretation that can be considered plausible. This analysis will not 
be developed in this text (see Machado/Püschel/Rodriguez 2009). 
The dispute over how to interpret facts and apply the law by 
means of dogmatic debate is absolutely normal. To think of the ap-
plication of statutes without considering the indeterminacy of legal 
norms and the room for dogmatic argumentation is a mistake. In these 
cases, the judge applying the law must be familiar with a whole range 
of categories (such as “racism”, “racial discrimination”, “racial sland-
er”, and principles of interpretation of criminal statutes), hence in-
creasing the range of interpretations and the indetermination of norms.  
The situation becomes problematic here – determining the prema-
ture termination of cases – because of the different procedural regimes 
involved in the dispute and the paradoxical procedural rules applied 
to the problem: namely, that the recognition of a new classification 
that subjects the case to new procedures harkening back to a preced-
ing moment and end up suppressing rights. In other words, the of-
fended party is required to have taken measures that were not neces-
sary at the outset, due to a change in legal requirements, and under 
threat of seeing the case closed. 
The rule that determines the six-month deadline from the moment 
the perpetrator’s identity is made known is a decisive factor when one 
considers the problematic results found. The difficulty in upholding a 
solution that escapes the application of this penal procedure rule, 
which has no legally established exceptions, shows us that we are 
facing a systemic problem. This problem would be better resolved 
by means of a change in legislation, so the crime of racial injury could 
then be tried by means of a criminal procedure to be initiated by 
the public prosecutor. This situation has motivated the recent change 
in the legislation, with Law # 12.033/2009, which altered the prose-
cution regime for the racial slander – it must now be prosecuted by 
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the public prosecutor, after a formal authorization of the offended 
part (“ação penal pública mediante representação”). 
This change will also help to avoid the procedural problems 
faced by privately sought penal cases such as, problems of access to 
justice, difficulties arising from briefing, and questions involving 
how to comply with the stricter rules involving the submission of a 
criminal action, all of which prompted the closure of many cases.  
In addition, as we have already mentioned, most of the dismissals 
and acquittals were due to a lack of evidence. The Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights in its report on human rights in Brazil 
(1997) specifically mentioned the relevance of this issue that was  
revealed by the data collected. It stated that  
Law # 7.716 proved to be “difficult to enforce since it establishes me-
chanisms to facilitate proof that a crime has been committed. Moreover, 
by making it necessary to prove that discrimination was intended leads to 
situations in which the aggressor and the aggrieved must confront one 
another and the offense must be proved objectively”.24 
Proper critique of the suitability or its lack thereof in these rulings can 
be made only after a qualitative appraisal of these cases taking into 
consideration the principle of the judge’s freedom to evaluate evi-
dence. As hard as it is to evaluate cases that involve intersubjective 
insults, already difficult to prove, the number of dismissals and abso-
lutions due to a lack of evidence points to the need to reevaluate legal 
institutions and the way they deal with racism in the courts. 
This matter is certainly worth looking into. We do not know, for 
example, if the difficulties over proof arise from badly briefed cases 
(which can be corrected through measures that improve the quality of 
legal services and the quality of police investigations and guidance), 
or the out-of-date doctrine (which sees in the category of “criminal 
intent” a need for proof of a psychological order and hence to vie 
for the prevalence of another mode of understanding the elements 
that comprise the notion of crime), or “excess demand” on the court’s 
behalf or some sort of predisposition to absolve (which should cer-
tainly be the object of democratic and critic control, but which can 
                                                     
24  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Report on the Situation of 
Human Rights in Brazil, 1997 (<www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/brazil-eng/index-
brazil.htm> (04.02.2009). 
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only be confirmed through empirical analyses), or even the fact that 
most of the cases depend on personal evidence.  
It is evident that the premature closure of the cases is not the 
kind of response expected from social movements or affected parties 
who submit their demands to the legal system. But there are whole 
series of possible explanations for the termination of these cases 
that cannot be reduced to the unproven thesis that the legal system is 
impermeable to cases dealing with racism, or that it is somehow act-
ing in an ideological manner and has an interest in undermining anti-
racist legislation.  
In fact, we did found rulings that describe racist attacks as “arc-
haic slang, devoid of racist content” or “destitute of any pejorative 
meaning” or still the inexistence of the intent of depreciating the 
group – and this kind of reasoning when neither the event itself, nor 
the identity of the perpetrator were being questioned. It is only in the 
context of these cases that one can firmly state that the judge trying 
the case was insensitive to racial conflict. However, this happened  
on a smaller scale: in six cases of absolutions and in five cases of an-
nulments of the case. These cases represent only 8.1% of cases. 
With regard to the analysis of law enforcement, this research 
sought to investigate more closely the general claim that the judiciary 
is insensitive to racial issues when we look at the low number of con-
victions. It seems that an evaluation of the effectiveness or ineffec-
tiveness of Brazilian laws against racism should not be summed up or 
connected primarily to the number of convictions, but to the dynam-
ics of creating and enforcing the law. This led us, among other things, 
to investigate more closely the behavior of the judiciary when faced 
with cases of racism. Thus, we sought to further understand the deci-
sions and their grounds beyond the concrete result only measured 
by the number of convictions.  
The empirical study is still ongoing and the data collected has 
not yet been able to provide a snapshot of the Brazilian judiciary’s 
attitude regarding this theme. However, the results already obtained 
seem relevant. Firstly, they relativize the idea that the law is not en-
forced. An analysis that affirms the “effectiveness” of the law from 
the number of convictions overlooks the specific issues found inside 
the legal system and fails to point out new pathways for further dis-
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cussion on the use of legal instruments in the anti-discriminatory fight, 
nor does it consider its limitations and possibilities. 
Moreover, the results mentioned above have made visible the 
presence of issues that have significantly influenced the unsatisfacto-
ry outcome of cases: the problem of disqualification and preemption, 
evidentiary stage, and the difficulties inherent in the processing of 
cases according to the regime of private prosecution.  
In addition to the data itself, what is clear in this research is that 
it is not possible to explain the results without taking into considera-
tion a number of factors that are questioned at the time of law en-
forcement, as well as paying close attention to the stumbling blocks 
of the legal system.  
Clearly, those in charge of enforcing the law are required to 
deal with a variety of categories (“racism”, “racial defamation”, prin-
ciples of criminal law enforcement), which increase the possibilities 
of interpretation, thus increasing the indeterminacy of legal rules. The 
more possibilities judges have to decide the concrete cases, the more 
outcomes they will come up with. As a statute created a new catego-
ry, one can say the creation of this statute increased Law’s inde-
terminacy. In the cases analyzed, there was a divergence between 
the legal classification given to the fact – and the reclassification 
made by the court, which ultimately influenced the final problematic 
effect, is a justifiable way to decide this divergence.  
Moreover, strictly technical-procedural issues should also be con-
sidered to understand the issue: the differences filing a criminal action 
and differences in processing schemes among those offenses yet to 
be criminalized is key to the problem of preemption or nullity, which 
is a cause of dismissal for most cases. This might not happen if we 
had at our hands two crimes against the public order. That is, at this 
point, one cannot overlook the paradoxical effect that the difference 
in regimes results in the discussion of classification of the case.  
Furthermore, as for the lack of evidence, a criticism of the ap-
propriateness or inappropriateness of that decision would only be  
possible from a qualitative analysis of the case, when one considers 
the principle of free findings of the judge.  
Recognizing the specificities of legal reasoning and modus ope-
randi of the criminal justice system does not mean giving up criticiz-
ing the practical results of that system. Instead, it makes it possible 
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to go beyond a pessimistic and generalizing conclusion that judges 
are racists or that our judiciary system is insensitive to the struggle 
for equality, in order for further research on the elements that con-
tribute to the lack of responses considered unsatisfactory.  
As for the relationships between social movements and the law, 
we advocate that understanding the dynamics and the logic of the le-
gal system also helps to see the possibilities and limitations of each 
legal instrument in evaluating and deciding on legal strategies of ac-
tion to be taken both before the parliament and in the courts. 
 
4. Directions of Flow: Demands and Formal Institutions 
As shown in the first part of this paper, the judiciary has developed 
its own spaces for interacting with society. This includes room for 
making decisions, whose foundations are in dispute, as well as the 
mechanisms intended to bring to the decision-making venues inter-
ests to the arguments of various origins. Having said this, one won-
ders how these arguments arrive in those spaces; that is, what is the 
direction of flow of arguments between the law and the public sphere. 
When we consider the filing of a lawsuit by a group, association, 
political party, social movement, or any other politically active entity, 
the direction of movement seems to be from the public sphere to 
the legal system. These players compel the judiciary examine to their 
own arguments in deciding on the demands put on this branch of pow-
er. This would be ideally preceded and followed by turmoil in 
the public sphere, which would challenge formal institutions in sever-
al ways, including lawsuits.  
One of the topics to be researched on this problem is whether or 
not there are strategies for litigation organized by social movements, 
interest groups, and other societal entities. It would be wise to look 
for entities created solely to file lawsuits and take actions before the 
legislative branch of power and the government at large on issues 
relating to a particular topic and how they do it: do they hire perma-
nent attorneys, seek attorneys in the market, seal relationships with 
other entities composed of attorneys, have relationships with the Pub-
lic Attorney’s Office (MP)? 
In all these cases, it is clear that the flow of demands would clear-
ly be in the direction from the society to formal institutions, preceded 
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by a debate in the public sphere and the construction of a strategy 
involving the judiciary, since it is regarded as one of the more relevant 
political arenas.  
However, one must also consider that this is not the only possible 
direction for the flow of demands put forward by society. For exam-
ple, when we reflect on the Public Attorney’s Office and individuals 
as initiators of lawsuits, we can see that the direction of flow can be 
different. The Public Attorney’s Office, for instance, files suits inde-
pendently, even if they are not linked to social movements or interest 
groups, i.e., not resulting from a current pressure from the public 
sphere.  
Similarly, an individual may also bring about action despite being 
disconnected from any interest group whatsoever. In both cases, these 
actions may deal with topic or arguments that could mobilize the pub-
lic sphere.  
Here the direction of flow is, then, reversed: the encouragement 
comes from a formal institution and becomes relevant because it 
was discussed by and then disclosed for some reason by a media out-
let or another tool of communication.25 In all these cases, the judge, 
the individual and the Public Attorney’s Office discuss relevant issues 
involving various societal entities and, precisely because of that, the 
interested parties discuss and try to influence the judicial decision to 
be rendered. 
One can imagine, hypothetically, that the same thing can occur 
when a judge develops a given argument to justify his/her decision, 
and subsequently that argument awakens the public sphere, even in 
a case that is not inserted into a strategy of militancy. For example, 
in a recent case involving a football player labeled as gay by the me-
dia, the court issued its opinion on the relationship between homosex-
uality and football, which had wide repercussions and led several go-
vernmental organizations devoted to the cause of gays and lesbians to 
take action.26 
                                                     
25  In many issues, the MP has conducted independent investigations to sue individ-
uals, the state or private firms that have gained public interest afterwards. 
26  The judge was punished by his declarations. See “TJ de São Paulo mantém 
punição de censura a juiz do caso Richarlyson”, Última Instância (<www. 
ultimainstancia.uol.com.br>; 19.05.2011). 
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A relevant research topic could be further developed on how 
and why these individuals, judges or public attorneys have developed 
such arguments or put forward such demands. Drawing an ideo-
logical profile of individuals, understanding the circumstances under 
which they were inserted at that particular time, and understanding 
the internal policies of institutions and their relationships to society 
are all likely to shed light on this problem. As mentioned above, it 
may be possible that the actions filed or decisions taken by these  
players take advantage of a climate of unrest in the public or a la-
tent issue which, when treated by a state authority, begins to mobi-
lize opinions and grab the attention of the media. 
In any case, what matters here is to raise the main issues and 
make clear that the flow of demands will not always be from the  
public sphere to the formal institutions; the opposite may occur by 
virtue of the filing of actions or the development of arguments by a 
judge, an individual, or the Public Attorney’s Office. 
 
5. Next Steps 
Empirical investigations carried out by CEBRAP in a concerted ef-
fort with Direito GV began by examining the debates on cases of  
gender and racism within the judiciary, which has motivated theo-
retical reflections on the characteristics of jurisdictional rationality 
and separation of powers in Brazil. In one word, a glaringly obvious 
phenomenon is the conflict of interpretations that has imposed the 
need to rethink several points in legal theory. It can be said that 
the core issue is to deal with this conflict and explain its origin and 
dynamics.  
This question can be thought of as the relationship between the  
judiciary and society. As already seen, this research is intended to 
reflect on the meaning of various institutional mechanisms de-
signed to make the judiciary permeable to society and, on the other 
hand, to investigate how the demands are formed and how they come 
to the judiciary. After all, there may be demands addressed by oth-
er mechanisms of conflict resolution.  
One goal of our research is to identify the flows of society’s  
demands to the judiciary, but also being clear that the relationship 
between society and state in this case has its peculiarities. As al-
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ready seen, there may be demands that arise from formal institutions, 
but are targeted to the public sphere, as they try to speak on behalf 
of specific social interests. For this reason, research on this point of 
the problem cannot work with a tight definition of state and society. 
In fact, this problem also appears when we study the judiciary 
in isolation. After all, the mechanisms that are being created to relate 
to society are also redesigning the separation of powers in Brazil and, 
consequently, the boundaries between society and state. 
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